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22 December 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Indonesia: [A Soviet merchant ship and a tug, each towing a submarine chaser, appear to be en route to Indonesia with the first delivery of naval vessels under a [] agreement apparently concluded last summer. The Soviet ships, out of Vladivostok, were sighted west of Okinawa on 19 December. Under the agreement, Moscow is to provide a light cruiser, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and submarine chasers, as well as other small ships and amphibious warfare equipment for the Indonesian Marine Corps. Previously the USSR has furnished the Indonesian Navy [] worth of aid, including four destroyers, [] W-class submarines, and eight submarine chasers.] []

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: In a 21 December greeting honoring North Vietnam's Army Day, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao pledged "the utmost efforts to safeguard the Geneva agreements and put a stop to US imperialism's intervention and aggression in Laos." This implied threat is a further effort to deter support for Phoumi. The USSR, co-chairman with Great Britain of the 1954 Geneva Conference, has thus far remained silent on proposals from Peiping and Hanoi for reactivation of the ICC in Laos and reconvening the conference. It seems likely, however, that Moscow will soon respond by formally approaching London with this proposal. [Elements of Phoumi's force in Vientiane were reported moving northward on 21 December with the intention of engaging Kong Le's force.] []

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25X1 [Brazil: President-elect Janio Quadros plans a more "independent" and neutralist foreign policy after his inauguration on 31 January. He reportedly is "determined to disengage Brazil from economic dependence on the United States," and intends to reorient economic policy toward Britain and Europe, which he feels now have adequate financial resources and whose banking officials have given him assurances of loans and aid. He is reported to have authorized Vice President Goulart, who visited the USSR this month, to take the first steps toward closer cooperation with the USSR. Quadros, vacationing in Italy, still hopes to arrange a meeting of neutralist leaders on the Yugoslav island of Brioni and later to tour Latin America. Quadros reportedly believes such policies will buy off leftist criticism when he initiates orthodox fiscal policies at home.] [redacted] (Page 5)

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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- [redacted] [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.]
- B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.] No
- C. [The scale of Communist bloc airlift operations associated with the Laotian situation is consistent with what we believe to be a decision to provide sufficient support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces to prevent establishment of effective control over the country by an anti-Communist Lao government. This course of action will involve: a) an intensification of Pathet Lao guerrilla activity, b) the]

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[redacted] continuation of support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces in material and personnel, and c) an increase in the numerical strength of Pathet Lao forces.]

[It appears unlikely that the Communist bloc has decided to intervene openly with its own identifiable military forces at this time. A decision on its part to do so in the future, however, is not precluded and probably would be dependent in part on the bloc's estimate of its chances of success in achieving a military or political settlement acceptable to the Communists.]

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25X1 Delivery of Soviet Naval Vessels to Indonesia

25X1 [Two Soviet submarine chasers, towed by a freighter and a tug, apparently are being delivered to Indonesia under the [redacted] naval aid agreement concluded by Admiral Martadinata during his visit to Moscow this summer. The four Soviet ships--out of Vladivostok--were sighted west of Okinawa on 19 December. The Soviet Union delivered ships to Indonesia in 1959 from Vladivostok employing similar methods.]

25X1 [Previous deliveries of bloc naval units to Indonesia, [redacted] included four destroyers, two submarines, and eight subchasers. Under the new naval agreement, Moscow is to provide a light cruiser, two destroyers, four submarines, six minesweepers, eight patrol craft, ten motor torpedo boats, and an assortment of auxiliary ships. In addition, amphibious equipment--consisting of landing vehicles and tanks--and artillery are scheduled to be supplied to the Indonesian Marine Corps.]

25X1 [A high-level Indonesian mission, including Foreign Minister Subandrio, Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Suryadarma, Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, and several ranking naval officers, is due to arrive in Moscow later this month. The make-up of the delegation and the apparent initiation of Soviet naval deliveries to Indonesia suggest principal emphasis during the visit will be given to negotiating the air force's requests of last July for additional Soviet equipment. At that time the air force asked Moscow to provide two squadrons of MIG-19 or MIG-21 jet fighters and one squadron of TU-16 jet bombers, as well as ground-to-air and air-to-air rockets. In addition, General Nasution--who has been thus far reluctant to follow the lead of the navy and the air force in procuring large amounts of bloc materiel--may use this opportunity to explore again the possibility of accepting large-scale Soviet arms aid.]

[redacted]

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Brazilian President-Elect Plans "Independent"

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Foreign Policy

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[Brazilian President-elect Janio Quadros plans a more "independent" and neutralist foreign policy after his inauguration on 31 January.]

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[] the latter is "determined to disengage Brazil from economic dependence on the United States" and intends to reorient economic policy toward Britain and Europe, where he feels there are now adequate financial resources. Quadros has reportedly been assured by British and German bankers that their countries will grant Brazil loans and economic aid.]

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[Dantas has been mentioned as either a cabinet possibility or the first Brazilian ambassador to the USSR after diplomatic relations, broken in 1947, are resumed. Quadros, previously labeled a "Wall Street lackey" by the leftist press, promised during the election campaign to re-establish diplomatic relations with Moscow and to recognize Communist China. Through Dantas, Quadros reportedly authorized Vice President Goulart--who visited Moscow from 5 to 14 December--to take the "first steps" in establishing closer cooperation with the USSR. Goulart had previously planned to visit Communist China, but his unexpected return to Paris on 14 December was interpreted by the press as indicating he has abandoned the idea.]

[Quadros, who is vacationing in Europe after an eye operation, still hopes to arrange a meeting of neutralist leaders on the Yugoslav island of Brioni. After his return to Brazil he intends to make short visits to all Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Argentina and Paraguay.]

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
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The Director of Intelligence and Research

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